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Abstract
Typically inequality is not taken into account to assess the e¤ects
of policy changes over aggregate variables. We study the decline of
expected ination in a closed economy, and show that the e¢ ciency
e¤ect of the decline is larger than what is usually reported even when
inequality is considered. Here, the exogenous joint distribution of the
householdscharacteristics is an important factor behind the magni-
tude of the change of the aggregates in the economy. In addition, we
show that the decline of ination improves equality of welfare across
households for any calibration that is consistent with the actual joint
distribution of the householdscharacteristics in a developed economy.
1 Introduction
The decline in the average ination rate, between the early 80s and the late
90s was arguably the most sustained, widespread and important among all
the economic policy regime changes in recent history. Between the early 80s
and the late 90s the average ination declined by more than 10 percentage
Please do not quote.
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points across the developed economies and stayed stable since. This paper
develops a model to evaluate the e¤ects in welfare and inequality of this
change in the ination regime.
The majority of the empirical evidence nds a positive correlation be-
tween average ination and measures of income inequality. Albanesi (2007)
nds a strong correlation between ination and the Gini coe¢ cient for pre-
tax income for 51 industrialized and developing countries between 1966 and
1990. Romer and Romer (1998) have quantitatively similar results obtained
by regressing inequality on ination. Easterly and Fisher (2001) present
indirect evidence on the distributional e¤ects of ination, using household
pooling data on 38 countries, nd that the low income households perceive
ination as more costly than high income households. Others, like Beetsma
and Van DerPloeg (1996), Bulir (1998), Crowe (2006), Dolmas et al. (2000)
and Ghossouba and Reed (2017) also nd a negative correlation between
ination and income inequality.1
On the other hand, unanticipated ination is positively correlated with
inequality. Coibion et al. (2012) show that contractionary monetary policy
shocks by the Federal Reserve have historically been followed by persistent in-
creases in income and consumption inequality. Doepke and Schneider (2006)
who are concerned with how unanticipated ination shocks a¤ect nominal
asset holdings nd that the main losers with ination are the rich families.
Richer households lose the most, as they tend to be net savers with deposits
and short-term denominated debt. The group that would experience larger
net wealth increases is middle-aged, middle-class households because they
tend to hold long-term nominally denominated debt in the form of xed-
rate mortgages. Thus, there is a clear di¤erence between unanticipated and
anticipated monetary policy, in terms of its e¤ects on inequality.2
This paper aims at understanding how anticipated monetary policy in
an economy with structural heterogeneity across households impacts on the
aggregate variables. The novelty is that we discipline the model with the
empirical facts that characterize the cross section of portfolios used for trans-
actions in most developed economies. One of the goals is to establish how
far the results are from the ones obtained in a representative agent economy
and evaluate how reasonable is the assumption of aggregation that typically
1In contrast, Maestri and Roventini (2012) nd that for a few countries the empirical
correlation between ination and various inequality series is inconclusive.
2Pedro Amaral (2017) contains a survey of the theoretical channels between monetary
policy and income and wealth inequality, as well as a survey of the empirical evidence.
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is made in these type of studies. We also want to understand the mecha-
nisms by which di¤erent agents are di¤erently impacted by the change in the
ination regime.
There is a large theoretical literature that studies the aggregate implica-
tions of ination in a representative agent economy. There is signicantly
less research on how the e¢ ciency gain of a lower ination regime depends
on the heterogeneity in the economy, and how this regime change a¤ects in-
equality. The relatively few existing papers on this subject di¤er in many
ways. They di¤er in their motivation for money (cash-in-advance restric-
tions, transactions costs, market timing frictions, trading constraints, and
so on), in the (un)availability of assets other than money and production
possibilities available. The reported ndings often di¤er in several dimen-
sions and the di¤erences are associated with the type of model adopted.
For instance, Akyol (2004) studies optimal risk-sharing in a pure exchange
economy where bonds and money are held only for precautionary purposes.
Positive ination in this model ensures maximum risk-sharing, redistributing
surplus to low-income agents. In a random matching model Molico (2006)
shows that some ination can improve social welfare because higher ina-
tion can reduce wealth and price dispersion. Boel and Camera (2011) have
a model based on Lagos and Wright (2005), where they show that the im-
pact of ination depends on the nancial sophistication of the economy. If
money is the only asset, then ination hurts more the wealthier and more
productive agents, while those poorer and less productive may even benet
from ination. In a more sophisticated nancial environment where agents
can insure against consumption risk, with other assets, the opposite result
holds. Erosa and Ventura (2002) in a transactions cost model show that at
the aggregate level, ination a¤ects the economy as in the standard monetary
growth model with a representative agent, but that ination is e¤ectively a
regressive consumption tax. As such a decline in ination benets relatively
more the poor households.
Our paper is closely related to Erosa and Ventura (2002). We have a
similar model, with a transaction technology, bonds and production. Like
they, we perform a revenue neutral experiment so that another distortionary
tax is adjusted when ination changes to satisfy the government budget con-
straint. We address the same two questions: whether the aggregate macro
variables depend on the existing degree of exogenous inequality in the econ-
omy, and whether the decline in ination can decrease inequality. There are
di¤erences between the two papers. We assume that householdspreferences
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besides depending on the consumption level are also a function of the labor
hours. Thus, unlike in their model, in our model ination, as well as the
alternative tax, a¤ects the intra marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure. Another di¤erence is that they consider two types of
households: one with high productivity and another with low productivity
shocks. In contrast we consider more types of households, that as in the data
di¤er with respect to wealth and productivity.
To consume the household has to buy transactions services. The transac-
tions services are produced according to a transactions technology that uses
as inputs credit and cash.3 When the transactions technology is constant re-
turns to scale we are able to obtain a closed form equilibrium solution, using
the methods described in Correia (1999), which allow the equity ranking of
policies to be done by resorting to a simple relative di¤erential concept. How-
ever, this type of technology is not compatible with the cross section facts on
transactions.4 To conform with these facts we consider an increasing returns
to scale technology. However, once the transaction technology has increasing
returns to scale we are not able anymore to obtain a closed form equilibrium
solution. Instead, we have to solve numerically the equilibrium conditions to
obtain the equilibrium.
The paper has novel results. In the context of a constant returns to scale
transactions technology a simple condition that establishes the relationship
between ination and welfare inequality is obtained. It is possible to compute
the equilibrium prices of the economy as if households were identical, and
to determine, in a simple way, the qualitative e¤ect on equity of the decline
of ination. In this framework e¢ ciency increases always with a change
to a lower ination regime. For the GHH preferences the size of the gain
does not depend on the distribution of the productivity across the house-
holds.5 This means that for these preferences we are able to maintain the
assumption of a representative agent, or that we have Gorman aggregation.
3It is irrelevant for the resullts to assume a market for credit or in the household
production of credit, since the tax on labor is not the alternative instrument in the model.
If that was the case then it would make a di¤erence. The market provision of liquidity
can be interpreted as being done by the nancial sector.
4First, high income individuals use cash and cash plus checks for a smaller fraction of
their transactions than low income individuals. Second, the fraction of household wealth
held in liquid assets decreases with income and wealth. And third, a nontrivial fraction
of households does not own a checking account and/or do not use credit cards to perform
transactions.
5These preferences are described in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988).
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Although the economy is populated with heterogeneous households, the ag-
gregate macroeconomic variables do not depend on the specic distribution
of the householdswealth or e¢ ciency levels. On the other hand, in general
the e¤ect over welfare inequality depends on the characteristics of the wealth
and productivity distributions as well as the functional form of the utility
function. For the GHH preferences and for any reasonable joint distribution
of wealth and e¢ ciency the welfare inequality decreases with the change to
a lower ination regime.
In the context of an increasing returns to scale transactions technology,
contrary to Erosa and Ventura (2002), for a given policy the aggregate e¤ect
depends on the exogenous heterogeneity. We consider a model economy that
is be able to replicate the cross section data on the means of payments used
in transactions and calibrate it to the U.S. wealth and income distribution
quintiles. It is found that the di¤erence to the representative agent case
is signicant. Thus, the e¤ect of the decline on e¢ ciency is dependent on
the existing heterogeneity. Another result is that the e¤ects on equity tend
to reinforce the e¤ects on e¢ ciency. There is no trade-o¤: a lower ination
increases e¢ ciency and equity. Finally, the paper conrms Erosa and Ventura
(2002) result that the impact of a moderate ination varies noticeably across
segments of society.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model economy. Section 3 discusses the case where the transaction technol-
ogy is constant returns to scale. Although this simple model can display the
observed cross section characteristics of consumption and labor, it is not able
to replicate the cross section evidence on wealth composition and transaction
patterns. Section 4 takes care of this by extending the model to an increasing
returns to scale technology. With this extension the model can replicate the
cross section facts on payments patterns but it becomes a non-aggregable
heterogeneous household model, and the equilibria associated with the dif-
ferent levels of ination can only be computed by resorting to the traditional
numerical computation methods. Section 5 discusses the solution method,
the calibration and the results for this case. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The set-up is a exible price cash in advance economy real business cy-
cle model with heterogeneous households in which, as in Correia and Teles
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(1996), a transactions technology generates an endogenous size of the credit
good sector. As we are interested in studying the optimal level of ination
in the long run we assume there is no uncertainty and that ination is fully
anticipated by rms and households. As such, without loss of generality we
restrict our focus to the di¤erent stationary equilibria associated with the
di¤erent ination rates. Given stationarity, the real interest rate is constant
across policies and there is a one to one relationship between changes in ina-
tion and changes in the nominal interest rate. The monetary policy regime is
therefore characterized either by the nominal interest rate or by the ination
rate.
In order to consume households must pay the price of the good but must
also incur in transactions costs, associated with the use of credit services
and cash. As households have the same utility function, if the transactions
function has constant returns to scale then the intratemporal marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure, per units of e¢ ciency, is
equated among all households. However, if the transactions technology is not
of the constant returns type then these marginal rates of substitution will not
be equated across households. Thus, an increasing returns to scale transac-
tions technology, which is suggested by the data, together with heterogenous
households generates a friction in the economy.
In the model rms are prot maximizers. The production technology
uses capital, Kt 1, and labor, Nt, to produce the period t good according to
a Cobb-Douglas production function, F (Kt 1; Nt) = zKt 1N
1 
t , with z > 0
and 0 <  < 1: The markets for the factors of production are competitive
so that the wage rate, wt, is equal to the marginal physical productivity of
labor,
wt = FN(Kt 1; Nt) = (1  ) z

Kt 1
Nt

, (1)
and the rent on capital, rKt , is equal to the marginal physical productivity of
capital,
rKt = FK(Kt 1; Nt) = z

Nt
Kt 1
1 
. (2)
The households take decisions over consumption, labor, capital as well
as over the means of payment. Households hold money because it is an
alternative means of payment to costly credit. Credit services are produced
by a production function that uses only labor as input. Like in Erosa and
Ventura (2002), the production function of this service uses one (e¢ ciency)
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unit of labor per unit of service produced. Competition guarantees that
nancial intermediaries will make zero prots and charge a price equal to
their marginal cost.
The transaction technology is
si;t = l(mi;t 1; Ci;t);
where si;t, mi;t 1; and Ci;t represent, credit services, real balances and con-
sumption of household i; respectively. Function l is decreasing in mi;t 1 and
increasing in Ci;t. In the literature, see for instance Correia and Teles (1996),
it is usually assumed that si;t is time spent in transactions, which is not
traded in the market. Here, because it is more realistic and simplies the
analysis, we take it as being traded in the market.
The households are heterogeneous in two dimensions. They are di¤eren-
tiated by their e¢ ciency level, and their initial real wealth, represented by
Ei and Ai. The e¢ ciency levels have a positive support but the initial real
wealth can be negative for some households. Each household sells hours, Ni;t,
in the labor market. The market real wage for each unit of EiNi;t is wt.
Each household maximizes the discounted sum of future momentary util-
ity levels, where the discount parameter is , with 0 <  < 1. That is,
household i maximizes 1X
t=0
tui;t; (3)
where ui;t is the momentary utility function. Function ui;t is the same across
households, ui;t = u(Ci;t; Ni;t):
The sequence of budget constraints of household i is:
Pt(1 +  c)Ci;t + wtPtsi;t +Mi;t +Bi;t + PtKi;t  wtPtEiNi;t+
Mi;t 1 + (1 +R)Bi;t 1 + PtKi;t 1
 
rKt + 1  

, for t = 0; 1; 2; ::: (4)
where Pt is the price of the good at date t,  c is the tax on consumption,
R is the net nominal interest rate,  is the depreciation rate and rKt is the
rental rate of capital. The initial nominal wealth level of household i, P0Ai,
is Mi; 1 + (1 + R)Bi; 1 + P0Ki; 1
 
rK0 + 1  

, where Mi; 1 is the initial
nominal money holdings, Bi; 1 is the initial nominal bonds, and Ki; 1 is the
initial capital.
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In a stationary equilibrium the intertemporal marginal rate of substitu-
tion for consumption implies:
Pt+1
Pt(1 +R)
= . (5)
The non arbitrage condition between bonds and capital requires that
(1 +R) =
 
rKt + 1  

Pt+1
Pt
. (6)
From (5) and (6) we obtain that rKt is constant across policies and time.
Moreover, from (2) the ratio of total hours to capital, Nt
Kt 1
, is constant across
policies and time. Therefore, the real wage, from (1), will be constant across
policies and time too.
From (4) and (6) we can write the intertemporal budget constraint of
household i asX1
t=0
Qt [MtR+ Pt(1 +  c)Cit + Ptwsi;t   PtwEiNi;t] = P0Ai, (7)
where Qt = 1(1+R)t ; R  R1+R and Ai  Mi; 1+(1+R)Bi; 1P0 +Ki; 1
 
rK0 + 1  

.
Dividing (7) by P0 and using the fact that in a stationary equilibrium
condition (5) is satised we arrive at the stationary budget constraint of
household i,
(1 +  c)Ci + wl (mi; Ci) +Rmi = wEiNi + (1  )Ai, (8)
where we have dropped the index t to simplify the notation.
The optimal choice of money holdings satises:
 wlmi = R; for
mi
Ci
< 1: (9)
This equation says that the choice of real money is such that the cost of
one additional unity of money, R, should equalize the benet in reducing the
transaction costs, which is the decline in hours spent with credit transactions
that that additional unit of money enables times the wage, wlmi (mi;Ci).
Clearing in the market for the good implies,
F (N;K) =
Z
S
Cidi+ w
Z
S
l (mi; Ci) di+K +G, (10)
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where S is the set of households. In equation (10) we used the clearing
condition in the labor market, N =
R
S
EiNidi; and the clearing condition in
the market for capital, K =
R
S
Kidi:
The government collects revenues, from the ination tax and from the
tax on consumption, to nance an exogenous constant public consumption,
G, and payments on the initial public liabilities,
Ag  1
P 00
Z
S
Mi; 1di+ (1 +R)
Z
S
Bi; 1di

:
The initial public liabilities include the initial stock of money and the initial
stock of public bonds.
The stationary budget constraint of the government can be obtained from
(8) and (10),
R
Z
S
midi+  c
Z
S
Cidi = G+ (1  )Ag: (11)
The rst term on the left hand side of equation (11) is the seigniorage and
the second term is the consumption tax revenue. The rst term on the right
hand side of equation (11) is the government consumption, G, and the second
term the payments on the public liabilities, Ag. Thus, when a change in the
ination regime is contemplated, the change in the interest rate implies an
associated change in the consumption tax, so that the government is able
to nance the same public consumption and debt payments. In particular,
if the economy is on the "e¢ cient" side of the La¤er curve a drop in the
interest rate implies an increase in the consumption tax.
3 Constant returns to scale in transactions
In this section function l is homogeneous of degree 1; i.e. constant returns to
scale CRS, and so it can be written as l(mi; Ci) = L(mi=Ci)Ci. Function L is
characterized by L0 < 0 and L00 > 0, so that an increase in the real quantity of
money decreases the time spent with transactions at a decreasing rate. For a
given ratio of money to consumption, mi
Ci
, the marginal and the average labor
productivity on transactions do not depend on the level of consumption.6 An
6We consider this case as the benchmark case. Later, in accordance with the evidence,
it will be assumed that the transactions technology has increasing returns.
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example of such a technology is:
l (mi;Ci) = k

1  mi
Ci
2
Ci. (12)
In this case condition (9) implies
mi
Ci
=

1  R
2kw

 1; (= 1 for R = 0). (13)
This expression has the basic money demand properties, namely that money
demand increases with the amount of transactions, Ci; and declines with the
opportunity cost of money, R.
For a general CRS function, condition (9) implies
 L0

mi
Ci

=
R
w
; (14)
or
mi
Ci
=
m
C
=   (L0) 1
R
wt

, for all i 2 S: (15)
The proposition follows:
Proposition 1: When the transaction technology is CRS, mi
ci
is identical
across households. The quantity of money that a rich household maintains,
as a fraction of his transactions, is the same as the one held by a poor
household.
For the transaction technology (12), the budget constraint can be rewrit-
ten as
PCi = wEiNi + (1  )Ai; (16)
where P  (1+ c)+wk

1  mi
Ci
2
+Rmi
Ci
is the e¤ective price of consumption,
and mi
Ci
is given by equation (15). For a general CRS function, the e¤ective
price of consumption is
P  (1 +  c) + wL

mi
Ci

+Rmi
Ci
: (17)
It follows that P is constant across households, and includes the direct
tax on consumption,  c; and the indirect cost associated with the means of
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payment, wL + Rm
C
. This indirect cost depends on the opportunity cost
of holding cash, R, the unitary cost of labor used in credit, w, and the
transactions technology, L.
The problem of household i can be rewritten as maximizing u(Ci; Ni)
subject to (16). Among the rst order conditions we have
@u
@Ci
= P and @u
@Ni
=  wEi; (18)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of (16). These two conditions imply
that the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption is equal to the relative price of leisure
 uNi
uCi
=
wEi
P : (19)
Ination imposes two types of welfare costs: the cost of misallocation of
resources from the good sector to the credit sector and a distortion between
the relative price of leisure and its intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
with consumption. A decrease in ination diminishes these two costs, while
a decrease in the consumption tax only reduces the distortion between the
relative price of leisure and its intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
with consumption.
We now show that a government revenue neutral decrease in ination
decreases the e¤ective price of consumption. More specically, we prove that
the value of P that keeps the revenue of government constant is decreasing in
R: Consider the experiment of increasing the consumption tax in the amount
 c, and decreasing the nominal interest rate by R, so that
 c =  m
C
R > 0. (20)
The change in P ; P ; associated with (20) can be computed from (17)
P =  c + m
C
R+ wL0 @
 
m
C

@R R+R
@
 
m
C

@R R: (21)
By taking into account that L0 =  R
w
; from (14), we obtain that the sum
of the last two terms in (21) is zero. If  c and R change according to (20)
then P = 0. From (19) we get that N and C do not change since P = 0.
On the other hand, in this experiment the change in the revenue of the
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government,
 
 c +RmC

C, is equal to RC  m
C

, which is positive because

 
m
C

> 0. Since all the functions involved are continuous, it is possible to
decrease P and maintain the revenue of the government, if  c is increased
and R decreased in a smaller proportion than in (20).
Below we prove that in this environment a strong version of the Friedman
rule holds. This result is novel because it generalizes the Friedman rule to
an environment where we do not need to have a representative household.
Moreover, it shows that the welfare e¤ects of ination can be summarized
by their e¤ects on the e¤ective price of consumption, P, which claries the
Erosa and Ventura (2002) results.
For those households with positive initial wealth the intuition is clear:
When P drops the real e¤ective wage of all households increases, i.e. wEiP goes
up, which benets all households, additionally, if an household has Ai > 0
then a drop in P is advantageous too, since it increases his real e¤ective
initial wealth, wEiP . However, if an household has Ai < 0 then the drop in P
is harmful, as it increases his real e¤ective initial debt.7
It is convenient to introduce some denitions that will help proving a
strong version of the Friedman rule. Dene the optimal choices of household
i as
fC (P ; wEi; Ai) ; N (P ; wEi; Ai)g = arg max fu (Ci; Ni) s.t. (16)g .
It follows that the household is ow indirect utility is
vi  v (P ; wEi; Ai)  u (Ci ; Ni ) . (22)
Di¤erentiation of (22) gives
@vi
@P = uCi
@Ci
@P + uNi
@Ni
@P . (23)
The di¤erentiation of (16) with respect to P gives
Ci + P @C

i
@P   wEi
@Ni
@P = 0. (24)
Using (23), (24) and (18):
@vi
@P =  uCi
Ci
P < 0. (25)
7Since consumption, Ci, is positive and equal to wEiP Ni + (1  ) AiP there is a lower
bound on Ai.
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Since a lower ination is associated with a lower e¤ective price Proposition
2 follows:
Proposition 2: A decline in ination compensated by a revenue neu-
tral variation in the consumption tax is a Pareto movement. Even when
lump-sum taxes are not available and there is no representative household
everyone is better o¤ if money is not taxed. The government should follow
the Friedman rule and set the nominal interest rate to zero.
Next, we turn our attention to how ination a¤ects inequality in the
economy. More formally, we want to determine how the ratio of any pair of
utilities, vi
vj
, changes with ination when both the numerator and denomina-
tor are positive and the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Does
this ratio increase with a decrease in ination? If the answer is a¢ rmative
then household i and household j; become less distant (in terms of utility)
from each other, i.e. a decrease in ination leads to a reduction in the welfare
inequality. We prove that in general the answer depends on the instantaneous
utility function, and the distributions of wealth and e¢ ciency levels across
households.
The sign of the change in the relative welfare caused by a change in the
ination level is given by the sign of the derivative

@ vi
vj
=@P

,
sign

@
vi
vj
=@P

= sign

@ log vi
@ logP  
@ log vj
@ logP

,
and
@ log vi
@ logP  
@ log vj
@ logP =
@vi
@P
P
vi
  @vj
@P
P
vj
=
uCjCj
vj
  uCiCi
vi
. (26)
This is the general result linking relative welfare changes to the elasticity of
utility to consumption. This result is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: When vj > vi > 0 a decline in ination decreases in-
equality if
uCjCj
vj
<
uCiCi
vi
for all Cj > Ci; and when vi < vj < 0 a decline in
ination decreases inequality if
uCjCj
vj
>
uCiCi
vi
for all Cj > Ci:
For some momentary utility functions like the isoelastic, i.e. u (Ci; Ni) =
[Ci(1 Ni)]1 
1  , it is easy to determine the e¤ects of ination on inequality. For
this utility function the expression (26) is zero and it follows from propo-
sition 3 that the relative welfare does not change with ination. For other
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momentary utility functions, like the one we will be using later on in the
computational exercises, it is less trivial to establish whether expression (26)
holds. Consider the momentary utility function, u, which belongs to the
GHH class proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988),
u (Ci; Ni) =
1
1  

Ci   N
1+
i
1 + 
1 
; ;  > 0;   0; and  6= 1, (27)
where  is the curvature parameter,  determines relative importance of
leisure, 1 Ni, and consumption, Ci and 1= is the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. For this utility function the expression (26) is equal to
uCjCj
vj
  uCiCi
vi
= (1  )  sign (i;j) , (28)
where
i;j =
24 Cj
Cj   N
1+
j
1+
  Ci
Ci   N
1+
i
1+
35 :
We assume that in equilibrium Ci   N
1+
i
1+
> 0; for all i; which implies that
vi < vj < 0 for  < 1 and vj > vi > 0 for  > 1: In order to have a reduction
in inequality after a decrease in ination we must have, according to propo-
sition 3, i;j < 0. Thus, the change in relative welfare is determined solely
by the sign of the di¤erence between the gross-to-net consumption ratios,
i;j. The term i;j is negative if
N1+j
Cj
<
N1+i
Ci
. For these preferences the
competitive equilibrium condition for the intra marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption, (19), implies
N1+j =
wEjNj
P .
Thus,
N1+j
Cj
/ wEjNj
wEjNj + (1  )Aj /
1
1 + (1  ) Aj
wEjNj
,
and the sign of the term i;j depends on the initial wealth to labor income
ratios Ak
wEkNk
/ Ak
E
1+

k
, for k = i; j, or
sign (i;j) = sign

(Ej)
1+
 Ai   (Ei)
1+
 Aj

:
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The condition for the sign of i;j to be negative is that
Ai
Aj
<

Ei
Ej
 1+

; for i and j s.t. vi < vj, Aj > 0, or (29)
Ai
Aj
>

Ei
Ej
 1+

; for i and j s.t. vi < vj, Aj < 0. (30)
We can summarize the conditions under which a decrease in ination reduces
relative welfare:
Proposition 4: For the momentary utility function, u, given by (27),
a decline in ination compensated by a revenue neutral increase in the con-
sumption tax rate improves the welfare distribution when either (29) or (30)
is met.
There are simple corollaries to Proposition 3:
Corollary 1: If all households have the same positive initial wealth,
Ai = Aj > 0 for all i and j, whatever the distribution of e¢ ciency, a revenue
neutral decrease of ination would increase inequality.
It is easy to verify this corollary. If Ai = Aj and household j is better
o¤ than household i then Ej > Ei. In this case condition (29) is not met:
1 >

Ei
Ej
 1+

.
Corollary 2: If all households have the same productivity, i.e. Ei =
Ej > 0; for all i and j, whatever the distribution of wealth, a revenue neutral
decrease of ination would reduce inequality.
Notice that if Aj > 0 then condition (29) is met since AiAj < 1; and if
Aj < 0 then condition (30) is met since AiAj > 1:
According to proposition 4, in general a decline in ination does not imply
an automatic welfare inequality reduction. It depends on whether condition
(29) or condition (30) is satised. Conditions (29) and (30) depend on the
labor supply elasticity, 1

, the distribution of wealth, and the distribution
of e¢ ciency levels. The literature has considered values for 1= 2 [0:1; 1]
(see Dyrda et al (2012)). Among developed countries the data indicates that
households with more wealth are also more productive, i.e. the two char-
acteristics are positively correlated, and that wealth is more concentrated
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than labor income.8 We consider the ve representative households associ-
ated with the quintiles of the wealth distribution corresponding to the 1998
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).9 According to Budria et al. (2002) the
wealth quintiles of the shares on the total wealth for the 1998 SCF sample
are from the lowest quintile to the upper quintile:  0:3%, 1:3%, 5%, 12; 2%
and 81:7%. And the share in labor earnings for these wealth quintiles are
8%, 13%, 16:6%, 19:9% and 42:5%; respectively. Using these numbers it is
trivial to check that condition (29) is veried even for the most extreme case,
i.e. when 1

= 1. Thus, for the US the sign of i;j is negative and according
to proposition 4 a decrease in ination decreases inequality.
Next, we study how the aggregate variables react to changes in the distri-
bution of wealth and labor productivities for the case of the utility function
given by (27). We show that changes in the distribution of wealth or labor
productivities, that do not a¤ect the aggregate wealth or the aggregate pro-
ductivity, do not a¤ect the aggregate macroeconomic variables. Later, we
will see that this property does not hold if the transactions technology is not
of the constant returns to scale type.
The problem of maximizing (27) subject to (16) implies:
Ni =

wEi
P
 1

; (31)
and
Ci =
wEi
P Ni +
(1  )
P Ai. (32)
Equations (31) and (32) show that the labor supply of household i is
independent of his wealth, Ai, and the aggregate consumption is a function
of the aggregate wealth,
R
S
Aidi. Thus, changes in the distribution of the Ai;
that do not change
R
S
Aidi; do not a¤ect the aggregate variables. It is more
demanding to prove that aggregate output and consumption do not depend
on the distribution of the labor productivity.
8For instance, Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997) report Gini indices for labor earnings, income
(inclusive of transfers) and wealth in 1992 of 0.63, 0.57, and 0.78, respectively, while for
1995 Budria et al. (2002) report values 0.61, 0.55 and 0.80. Moreover, it is well known
that economic models have had di¢ culties in quantitatively generating the observed degree
of wealth concentration from the observed income inequality, see Cagetti and De Nardi
(2008).
9In section 4 we have a brief discussion for this choice of the base year.
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Two di¤erent heterogeneous economies with the same "e¤ective" produc-
tivity of the representative economy,
R
S
E
1+

i di, the same aggregate wealth,R
S
Aidi, the same public consumption, g, the same initial public debt, Ag, and
the same nominal interest rate, R, have the same aggregate consumption and
output. It does not matter the dispersion of the Eis, as long as
R
S
E
1+

i di is
invariant, because from (31) and (32) we obtain that aggregate consumption
is Z
S
Cidi =

1

 1
 hw
P
i 1+

Z
S
E
1+

i di+
(1  )
P
Z
S
Aidi; (33)
and the output can be written, using (1) and (31), as
F (N;K) =
 
w
1+

1  
!
1
P
 1

Z
S
E
1+

i di: (34)
We summarize this result as a proposition:
Proposition 5: Both the aggregate consumption and aggregate output
are invariable to variations in the wealth dispersion and productivity disper-
sion that keep
R
S
Aidi and
R
S
E
1+

i di unchanged.
10
In the next section we study what changes when an increasing returns to
scale transactions technology is assumed.
10Notice that, if instead the metric was to keep the average productivity,
R
S
Eidi, xed,
an increase in the dispersion of the Eis would increase
R
S
E
1+

i di. Everything else equal,
an economy with a higher
R
S
E
1+

i di would have higher aggregate consumption, and thus
would have a lower  c; which would imply a lower P; in order for the government budget
constraint to be veried. Therefore, in the economy with more dispersion of the Eis, the
aggregate consumption,
R
S
Cidi, which is given by (33), and the output, which is given by
(34), would be larger for two reasons: because
R
S
E
1+

i di is higher and because the e¤ective
price, P, is lower. The money consumption ratio, mc , does not change as R is invariant
too.
17
4 Economies of scale in transactions
The assumption of a constant returns to scale the transactions technology is
at odds with the cross section evidence on payment patterns. High income
families are more likely to perform cash management activities that reduce
their exposure to the ination tax per dollar transacted with money. As such
we now assume an increasing returns to scale credit technology,
l (mi;Ci) = k

1  mi
Ci
2
Ci +

1  mi
Ci

N; (35)
The main di¤erence between (35) and the credit technology (12), used before,
is the inclusion of a cost,

1  mi
Ci

N . This is a xed cost for a given share
of transactions with credit,

1  mi
Ci

.
When this transactions technology is used, the rst order condition (9),
which gives the optimal decision on money holdings is
mi
Ci
= 1  R
2wk
+
N
2kCi
if Ci >
wN
R ; and (36)
mi
Ci
= 1 if Ci  wNR
It is immediate to verify that, for any N > 0; the larger is the level of
consumption, Ci, the smaller is the share of transactions realized with cash,
mi
Ci
.
Proposition 6 follows:
Proposition 6: When transaction technologies are increasing returns to
scale, the share of cash used in transactions is not constant across households.
Richer households carry a lower share of their transactions with cash than
poorer households.
This money demand is in line with the facts on payments. The portion
of transactions paid with cash depends on the total volume of transactions
carried out by the household. Households with di¤erent Cis have di¤erent
mi
Ci
s. The households with Ci  wNR only use cash to pay for their transac-
tions. Dene household s to be the richest household that only uses cash to
pay for his transactions, i.e. one that has a level of transactions Cs, such that
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Cs =
wN
R : According to our ordering of the households then all households
i; such that i  s; have Ci < Cs and mi = Ci. The other subset of the
population, i < s; has Ci > wNR and use both cash and credit for payments.
However, they use a higher share of credit, the larger are their transactions,
that is the richer they are. Therefore, the higher the households wealth, the
lower is the households cash to wealth ratio. For the group of households
such that i < s; the money demand is given by mi =
 
1  R
2wk

Ci +
N
2k
:
The stationary budget constraint of household i; where i 2 S, can be
written as
PiCi + w

1  mi
Ci

N = wEiNi + (1  )Ai; (37)
where
Pi  (1 +  c) +Rmi
Ci
+ wk

1  mi
Ci
2
: (38)
The e¤ective price of consumption, Pi, is now specic to each household, in-
cludes a cost of holding money,Rmi
Ci
, and a cost of using credit, wk

1  mi
Ci
2
.
The transactions technology considered is appealing. The heterogeneity
of the e¤ective price of consumption across households is only a function
of the share of cash payments done by the households, which, as stated
in proposition 6, is now di¤erent across them. The higher the fraction of
payments with cash the higher is the e¤ective price of consumption, since
dPi
dmi
Ci
= R  2wk

1  mi
Ci

=
wN
Ci
> 0: (39)
It follows that:
Proposition 7: With economies of scale in the credit technologies the
households with a higher mi
Ci
ratio, i.e. the poorer agents consume less, face
a higher e¤ective price of consumption.
This result is quite important to understand the relation between ination
and inequality. It says that when the monetary model economy is able to
replicate the payments facts, households react to ination di¤erently, some
decide not to use credit, and those that use it choose di¤erent intensities.
For an invariant tax rate on consumption, the existence of increasing returns
to scale in the use of credit implies, an e¤ective price of consumption that
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decreases with the volume of transactions done. The richer the household is
the lower is his e¤ective price of consumption.
According to proposition 7, the e¤ective consumption price for the poorer
households is higher than for the richer ones, i.e. PiPj > 1 for i > j (according
to the ordering Ci < Cj). When ination increases all households face a
higher price but because the richer households can substitute cash for credit
at a lower cost, the price faced by the richer households increases by less than
the one faced by the poorer households. The relative price of consumption
across agents, i.e. the relative price PiPj for all i > j, increases with the
ination level. Thus, the e¤ect on equity of an ination regime change is
amplied since ination amplies the exogenous inequality.
This can be shown formally. Using equation (38) the sign of the direct
e¤ect of a marginal change in ination on the ratio PiPj ; i.e.
@
Pi
Pj
@R ; is given by
Pjmi
Ci
  Pimj
Cj
=

(1 +  c) + wk

1  mj
Cj
mi
Ci

mi
Ci
  mj
Cj

> 0 (40)
as 1  mi
Ci
>
mj
Cj
: Thus, ination has a direct e¤ect on the relative e¤ective
price of consumption that is positive, i.e.
@
Pi
Pj
@R > 0: Proposition 8 follows:
Proposition 8: With economies of scale in the transactions technology,
the direct e¤ect of ination is regressive. Higher ination increases the con-
sumption e¤ective price of the poorer households more than the consumption
e¤ective price of the richer ones.
We saw in the previous section that ination is an additional source of
inequality when the credit technology is a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy. For the relevant labor supply elasticities and distributions of wealth and
income, a decrease in ination improves the welfare distribution, according
with proposition 4. Instead, with increasing returns to scale, besides being
another source of inequality, the direct e¤ect of ination is regressive also.
Thus, we should expect that a decline of ination would reduce inequality
further, as it would have e¤ects similar to the ones associated with the im-
plementation of a more progressive scal policy.
With increasing returns to scale the e¤ect over seigniorage can be dif-
ferent too. The richer households, may pay more seigniorage when ination
decreases. The change in the seigniorage paid by household i due to a change
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in R is 

Rmi
Ci
Ci

=

mi
Ci
  R
2kw

CiR +RmiCi @Ci@R R. Assuming that for
a rich household the second term is su¢ ciently small, which happens when
mi
Ci
is relatively small and R
2kw
is relatively high according with (36), then it
is possible that seigniorage paid by that household may increase with a drop
in R: That is clearly the case for the richer households that did not use cash,
i.e. for which mi
Ci
= 0; they will start paying seigniorage if the decrease in
ination is su¢ ciently large, for them to start using cash.
A necessary condition for aggregation is that the prices faced by the dif-
ferent agents be identical, but we have just seen that is not the case with
increasing returns, since the e¤ective price of consumption is specic to the
household. Below, we calibrate and compute numerically the stationary equi-
libria associated with di¤erent levels of ination in this non-aggregable het-
erogeneous household model. As always, when this type of methodology is
used, the results are conditional on the particular calibration chosen. The
calibration includes both values for the parameters that determine the aggre-
gate behavior and a joint distribution of characteristics across households.
5 Calibration and ndings
In this section, we describe the numerical solution, the parameterization of
the economy and present the main ndings. We are able to replicate the
aggregate qualitative e¤ects of ination referred by the literature and report
the distributive e¤ects of ination. The results show that is important to
consider heterogeneity to assess the impact of ination.
5.1 The numerical solution
Although the model is an heterogeneous non-aggregable model, the compu-
tation of the equilibrium is quite simple. It amounts to solving a system of
equilibrium static equations for a given policy. In this section we describe
these equilibrium conditions.
Dene function f(Ci) as being the optimal ratio between money holdings
and consumption for household i; which is given by (36), and function h(Ci)
as the e¤ective consumption price for household i; which is given by (38).
We repeat both expressions here for convenience,
f(Ci)  1  R
2wk
+
N
2kCi
=
mi
Ci
; (41)
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and
h(Ci)  (1 +  c) +Rmi
Ci
+ wk

1  mi
Ci
2
= Pi: (42)
The budget constraint (37) of each household i can be rewritten as
h(Ci)Ci + w(1  f(Ci))N = wEiNi + (1  )Ai: (43)
A rst order condition of the problem of maximizing (27) subject to (43)
is the intratemporal decision of household i
Ni =

1

wEi
h(Ci) + h0(Ci)Ci   wNf 0(Ci)
 1

=

1

wEi
Pi
 1

: (44)
Production is a function of aggregate e¢ ciency hours, N =
R
S
EiNidi;
and aggregate capital, K =
R
S
Kidi: Firms behave as perfect competitors.
The equilibrium real wage, w, is equal to the marginal productivity of labor,
w = (1  ) z

K
N

: (45)
The capital labor ratio K
N
is obtained from conditions (2), (5) and (6):
1

  1 +  = z

N
K
1 
: (46)
The government chooses the interest rate, R, and the consumption tax,
 c, that satisfy the budget constraint, (11), which we rewrite again here
R
Z
S
midi+  c
Z
S
Cidi = g + (1  )Ag. (47)
Given the parameters , , , and z, equations (46) and (45) deter-
mine the real wage w: Given w and the parameters , , , k, and N; the
initial wealth levels, Ais, the initial public debt, Ag, the interest rate, R,
the e¢ ciency levels, Eis, and the public consumption, g; the four equations
(41)-(44), one for each household, and equation (47) determine simultane-
ously the equilibrium variables fCi,Ni,miCi ,Pig; for every agent i 2 S and the
tax on consumption,  c.
Instead of solving a big system of equations our code takes an initial guess
solution for  0c and solves the various sets of four equations, (41)-(44), one
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set per household, for that  0c , obtaining the values fC0i ; N0i ,

mi
Ci
0
;P0i gi2S:
Equation (47) is veried for these values. If the left hand side of equation (47)
is larger than the right hand side then the subsequent guess for the consump-
tion tax,  1c is lower than 
0
c : If the left hand side of equation (47) is smaller
than the right hand side then the next guess for the consumption tax,  1c is
higher than  0c : For this new guess 
1
c we obtain fC1i ; N1i ,

mi
Ci
1
;P1i gi2S and
again check if equation (47) is veried for these values. The iterations stop
when the left hand side and right hand side are equal up to an innitesimal
value specied by the user.
5.2 Calibration
The real net worth of US households and non-prot organizations can be
obtained from the Federal Reserves "Flow of Funds" reports, which go back
to 1945. The net worth of the US households and non-prot organizations
has remained relatively consistent over time. The wealth-to-GDP ratio in
the period from 1945 and 1994 did not change much, uctuated between,
3:04 to 3:72, with a historical average of 3:45 for the 50 years from 1945 94.
After 1994 this ratio increased substantially achieving its highest value, 4:9,
in 2006, and decreasing thereafter to 3:98 in 2011. The historical average
for the period 1945-2011 is 3:6. Piketty and Zucman (2014) also document
that the wealth income ratio for the US gradually risen over the past four
decades, from about 300% in 1970 to 400% in 2010.11
Typically in the data wealth or net worth includes all assets held by the
households (real estate, nancial wealth, vehicles) net of all liabilities (mort-
gages and other debts); it is a comprehensive measure of most marketable
wealth. The key facts about the distribution of wealth have been highlighted
in a large number of studies, among others in Wol¤ (2012) and Kennickell
(2009). Wealth is extremely concentrated, and much more so than earnings
and income, as shown by Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997), Budria et al. (2002),
and Diaz-Gimenez et al (2011). For instance in the US, in 1998 the house-
holds in the top 1% of the wealth distribution held around one third of the
total wealth in the economy, and those in the top 5% held about 60 percent.
11According to Piketty and Zucman (2014) the top eight developed countries over the
past four decades, saw their wealth to income ratio rise from about 200300% in 1970 to
400600% in 2010. Italy achieved the highest value at 700%.
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At the other extreme, the bottom 40 percent had little or no assets at all.
For the calibration of the Ais and Eis we chose the wealth distribution
of 1998 for two reasons: it corresponds to the middle point of the 9 available
data sets from the SCF and displays a level of inequality that is roughly the
average of the nine levels of inequality associated with those 9 distributions of
wealth. We took a conservative approach by adopting the values in Budria et
al (2002) which imply a more homogeneous distribution of wealth than others,
like Wol¤ (2012) or Kennickell (2009). As we referred earlier, according with
Budria et. al (2002) the wealth quintiles of the shares on the total wealth
for the 1998 SCF sample were from the lowest quintile to the upper quintile:
 0:3%, 1:3%, 5%, 12; 2% and 81:7%. And in 1998 the share in labor earnings
for the wealth quintiles considered were: 8%, 13%, 16:6%, 19:9% and 42:5%.12
The  and  were assumed to be 1=3 and 0:1, respectively. These are
typical values in the literature for these parameters and imply a steady state
capital output ratio of 2:6 annually, and a steady state investment equal to
26% of the GDP. Assuming that the total public debt is 95% percent of the
annual GDP, which was approximately the value in 2011, and the monetary
base is 5% of the annual GDP, which was approximately the value between
1984 to 2007, then the public liabilities, Ag, are 100% of the GDP.13 Thus, we
took the ratio net wealth over output to be equal 3:6, which is the historical
average for the period 1945-2011.
The parameter values of the utility function are  = 1 and  = 2 (labor
elasticity of 0:5), which are within the intervals considered in the the liter-
ature. The discount factor is  = 0:97; which implies a real annual interest
rate of about 3%; which with a 12% annual ination rate, which was a typ-
ical value in the 70s and 80s, implies a nominal annual interest rate of 15%
(or R = 13%) and with a 2% annual ination rate implies a nominal annual
interest rate of 5% (or R = 4:8%).
Credit services related with transactions are a small percentage of output
on average. Aiyagari and Eckstein (1995) study the size of the banking sector
before and after successful stabilizations of high inations. The facts suggest
that the relative size of the banking sector increases during a period of accel-
12Let Y stand for income. We took A1 =  0:003Y  3:6, A2 = 0:013Y  3:6, A3 = 0:05Y 
3:6, A4 = 0:122Y  3:6 and A5 = 0:817Y  3:6. And for the Eis we chose wE1N1 = 0:08Y ,
wE2N2 = 0:13Y , wE3N3 = 0:166Y , wE4N4 = 0:199Y and wE5N5 = 0:425Y:
13After 2007 the ratio monetary base to GDP increased substantially but at the same
time the Federal Reserve Bank started to accumulate large amounts of public debt and
mortgage debt.
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erating ination and decreases immediately following a successful monetary
stabilization. According to Aiyagari and Eckstein (1995) the value added
share of credit services related with transactions for high ination countries
can reach 4%. For a low ination countries that value is smaller, for the US
in 1993 Aiyagari et al (1998) estimated that the costs (as a percentage of
GDP) of U.S. commercial banks in 1993 was a little over 1%. Silva (2012),
for an economy calibrated to the US, estimates the value added share of
credit services for a 10% ination to be about 2% of the GDP, and for a 0%
ination to be about 0:5% of GDP. In comparison with these estimates we
were conservative: our calibration for N and k delivers values around 1:8%
of GDP for an ination rate of 12% and costs of 0:1% for an ination rate
of 2%. For the ratio of public consumption over output we assumed it to be
0:18, which is not far from its historical value or from the values this ratio
assumed in the recent past.
We measure the money supply M as the M2 stock from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.14 The model delivers a money
velocity of 1:8 when the interest rate is 3% and a value of 2:9 for an interest
rate of 15%. The M2 money velocity in the US between 1959-1990 uctuated
between 1:7 and 1:9. After 1990 it increased steadily until 1997 when it
achieved the value of 2:2 thereafter it decreased gradually, achieving the
value of 1:74 in 2010.
5.3 The change of the ination tax
Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of an ination regime change associated with a
decline of the nominal interest rate, R, from 15% to 3% when the model
is calibrated to the US economy. As the ination rate decreases the money
consumption ratios increase for all quintiles. Except for the high interest rate
levels, the decrease in ination decreases total seigniorage and increases the
14According to Alvarez et al (2009) there is no substantial di¤erence in the opportunity
cost of demand deposits (in M1) and the components of M2 (savings and time deposits),
but with respect to other short-term assets the di¤erence is substantial. For instance the
foregone interest to hold assets in retail banks relative to short-term Treasury securities
U.S. between 1959-2006 was on the order of 2 percentage points. We interpret the gov-
ernment seigniorage as having two parts: the interest on the monetary base plus a tax
on the prots of the banks, which is equal to the product between the nominal interest
rate and the di¤erence between M2 and the monetary base. Assuming that these prots
are completely taxed away then seigniorage is simply the product between the nominal
interest rate and M2.
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total consumption tax revenue. For the high interest rates the decrease in
ination increases the seigniorage payments of the richer households which
leads to an increase in the aggregate seigniorage. With the decline in the
ination rate the e¤ective prices of consumption decrease for all quintiles
and the consumption levels and hours increase for all quintiles. The e¤ective
prices of consumption converge towards the value 1 +  c.
It can be seen from gure 1, that as a result of the decrease in the ination
rate all the consumptions increase, but the consumption levels of the poorer
households have a higher growth rate. For instance the consumption of the
lower quintile grows 7:2% when ination drops from 13% to 0%, while the
consumption of the upper quintile only grows 3:9%. Similarly for hours,
they increase for all quintiles but increase by more for the lower quintiles.
For example the hours of the lower quintile grow 2:2% when ination drops
from 13% to 0%, while hours of the upper quintile only grow 1:2%. The
growth rates of consumption and hours are larger for the lower quintiles
because they are the ones that experience higher reductions in the e¤ective
price of consumption.
The decline in ination increases e¢ ciency signicantly and monotoni-
cally. The cost in terms of output of a 15% nominal interest rate is almost
1:23% with respect to the best scenario, which corresponds to every household
choosing a money consumption ratio of one.15 When the nominal interest
rate is 5%, which corresponds to a 2% ination rate, that cost is only 0:07%.
The decline in ination has a positive e¤ect on equity too. All equity ratios
increase monotonically with the decrease in the ination rate. Thus, a more
equal economy can be attained as well as a more e¢ cient one, without having
to resort to a pure redistribution of wealth.
To study how heterogeneity a¤ects the results we consider a ctitious
economy where all households are equal, which we will refer from now on
as the homogeneous economy. Each household has the average productiv-
ity,

1
5
R
S
E
1+

i di
 
1+
, and the average wealth, 1
5
R
S
Aidi, of the benchmark
economy. The government consumption and government debt levels are the
ones of the benchmark economy. The parameters are unchanged too. Un-
like in the benchmark economy, in the homogeneous economy all households
have the same intratemporal marginal rate of substitution. As a consequence
the aggregate output is larger and the e¤ective price smaller in the homo-
15A su¢ cient condition to achieve the best scenario is to follow the Friedman rule.
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geneous economy. Figure 2 shows the e¤ects in this economy of decreasing
the nominal interest rate. Qualitatively the e¤ects are similar to the ones
in the benchmark economy. The sign of the e¤ects does not depend on the
heterogeneity of the economy, but the magnitudes of the e¤ects depend on
the inequality.
For any interest rate the aggregate output and consumption are larger in
the benchmark economy than in homogeneous economy. The di¤erences are
signicative, aggregate consumption in the benchmark economy is lower than
in the homogeneous economy by about 2% and output by about 1:5%. For
all interest rates the e¤ective price in the homogeneous economy is smaller
than the e¤ective price paid by any of the quintiles in the benchmark econ-
omy. The smaller di¤erence between the two e¤ective prices happens when
the when ination is zero, the e¤ective price in the homogeneous economy is
1:356, while the lowest e¤ective price in the benchmark economy is 1:363. The
consumption tax in the homogeneous economy is lower than the consump-
tion tax in the benchmark economy, and as ination increases the di¤erence
increases. This explains why the di¤erence between the e¤ective price in
the homogeneous economy and the e¤ective lowest price in the benchmark
economy increases with ination.
The decline in ination increases output in the homogeneous economy
too, but by less than in the heterogeneous economy. In the benchmark econ-
omy the output of a 15% interest rate is 1:14% smaller than the output
associated with the Friedman rule, while in the homogeneous economy the
output of a 15% interest rate is 1:03% smaller than the output associated
with the Friedman rule, i.e. a di¤erence of 10:7%. When the nominal interest
rate is 4% the di¤erence for the Friedman rule are 0% in the homogeneous
economy and 0:05% in the heterogenous economy. Thus, the e¢ ciency costs
are underestimated in the homogeneous economy.
5.4 E¤ects of heterogeneity on production and equity
Do the equilibrium variables change substantially when the distribution of
wealth in the economy becomes more unequal but everything else in the
economy is kept constant? Does production decrease as welfare inequality
increases? These are the questions we address in this section with another
experiment. In this experiment the parameters, the interest rate, public con-
sumption, public debt, householdsproductivity and aggregate wealth are
invariable but the distribution of wealth in the economy changes. We want
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to know what happens when the dispersion of the distribution of wealth in-
creases. More specically the population is divided in two groups: one group
contains one fth of the population, that becomes richer, while the other
group contains the remaining part, four fths of the population, which be-
come poorer. All the households have the same productivity level, the nom-
inal interest rate is kept at 15%, and the remaining parameters are the ones
we considered for the benchmark economy, including the aggregate wealth
level. Figure 3 contains the results of this experiment. The variable repre-
sented in the horizontal axis is an index of the di¤erence in wealth for the two
types. When this index takes the value 1 households are identical. As this
index increases the representative household of the poorer group becomes
poorer, he consumes less, has a higher ratio of money to consumption and
faces a higher e¤ective price of consumption. On the other hand, as the
representative household of the richer group has more wealth, he consumes
more and has a lower ratio of money to consumption. As the index of in-
equality increases, initially the e¤ective price faced by the richer decreases
as transaction costs decrease, but for high levels of wealth inequality, the
consumption tax starts increasing faster, and even the richer households face
a higher e¤ective price of consumption.
In gure 3 we consider a large set of wealth distributions: from a situation
of no inequality to a situation where the distribution of wealth is such that
the representative household of the richer group consumes about ten times
the amount consumed by the representative household of the poorer group.
For the most unequal distribution of wealth considered the output level is
about 1:8% smaller than the output associated with an equal distribution of
wealth. Since the equilibrium reacts to the redistribution of wealth across the
households, for a constant interest rate, the tax on consumption that satises
the budget constraint of the government changes too. The consumption tax
rate necessary to nance the exogenous government consumption increases
always with the inequality. The consumption tax rate increases by almost
two percentage points, from a little over 25% to about 27% as we go from an
economy without inequalities to an economy with a very unequal distribution
of wealth.
In the previous section we observed that decreasing simultaneously the
wealth and productivity inequality led to an increase in production. In this
section we saw that the same happens when we decrease wealth inequality
only, keeping the distribution of productivity constant. Thus, a pure redistri-
bution of wealth across households increases output. Here too, heterogeneity
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across households implies aggregate outcomes that are somewhat di¤erent
from the ones typically obtained when households are assumed homogeneous.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that, contrary to most heterogeneous agent
economies, the aggregate equilibrium is also signicantly a¤ected by the
heterogeneity. Identical economies in everything, except on the exogenous
householdswealth and productivity joint distribution have di¤erent aggre-
gate equilibria. While in the literature there is already a connection between
ination and inequality, there is to our knowledge no strong results on how
the relation between changes in ination and the aggregate outcome is inu-
enced by the underlying heterogeneity. The e¤ect of a change in the ination
regime over e¢ ciency and welfare inequality depends on the characteristics
of the wealth and productivity joint distribution.
Therefore in order to capture the gains from the decline in ination, we
need to take a position on the joint distribution that describes the house-
holds in the economy. Once we introduce in the model a distribution of the
householdscharacteristics in line with the empirical evidence, we get posi-
tive e¤ects on equity of an ination reduction, and obtain in addition results
on e¢ ciency that are larger, when compared with the ones usually reported
in the literature.
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